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Government-backed loan schemes have been introduced in many countries to enable 
small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) to have access to funding at a reasonable 
cost.  This paper evaluates the schemes offered in Malaysia by the Credit Guarantee 
Corporation (CGC).  The introduction emphasises the importance placed on the SME 
sector in achieving fully-industrialised status for Malaysia, and highlights the fact that the 
CGC has been charged with a critical role in assisting SMEs.  The paper then describes 
the operation of the CGC and its place within the spectrum of finance aimed at SMEs, 
before presenting the findings of an empirical review.  Three key areas are explored: the 
relationship between small firms, banks and the CGC; the level of finance additionality in 
evidence; and the level of economic additionality generated.  In each of these areas, the 
CGC’s effectiveness in meeting the needs of SMEs, banks and the wider economy 
appears to have been limited.  The paper then describes a radical new Scheme 
introduced by the CGC and assesses whether this Scheme will enable the CGC to 
achieve its objectives, notably a greater degree of finance and economic additionality.  
Finally, the implications of the CGC's experience for other developing countries are 
summarised. 
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Small and Medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in both developed and developing 
countries are perceived to play a crucial role in the economy.  However, businesses may 
never fulfil their potential if apparently viable SMEs face difficulties in obtaining external 
funding from private sector financial institutions, notably commercial banks.  As a 
consequence, government-backed loan schemes have been introduced in many 
countries, enabling smaller enterprises lacking security to obtain bank funding at a 
reasonable cost.  This article concentrates on the facilities offered in Malaysia by the 
Credit Guarantee Corporation (CGC). 
 
The economic strength of Malaysia was based historically on commodities such as 
rubber and palm oil.  Over recent years, industrialization has accelerated: the 
government is committed to a strategy of growth led by the private sector, an extensive 
privatization programme is in place, inward foreign investment is being attracted, and 
capital- and technology-intensive industries are encouraged.  The experience of newly 
industrialized countries in Asia, and of Japan, suggests that SMEs can play a crucial role 
in supporting balanced growth across a modern economy.  In Malaysia, official support 
for SMEs has been progressively increased, although the sector remains “very 
fragmented and characterized by a lack of product differentiation and appropriate 
technology” (Bank Negara, 1992). 
 
When the CGC was established in 1972, many small firms had to resort to non-
institutional sources of finance charging exorbitant rates of interest. This situation still 
prevailed in the 1980s, despite the efforts of the CGC and other government bodies 
(Fong, 1990).  There is still a perception in official quarters that SMEs lack appropriate 
financial support, hence the CGC has recently been restructured and strengthened.   
 
Previous attempts to measure the effectiveness of the CGC - as part of a major World 
Bank study (Levitsky and Prasad, 1987) and by Malaysian academics, for example 
Chee (1986, p.100-107) and Phang Hooi Eng (1992, p.128-34) - have used secondary 
data to describe its schemes in fairly general terms or to concentrate on one aspect of 
its operations, notably the default rate of guaranteed firms.  In other countries, reports 
on comparable schemes, for example, the United Kingdom's Loan Guarantee Scheme 
(Robson Rhodes, 1984; NERA, 1990; and, Pieda, 1992) and Small Business 
Administration Loans in the United States (Rhyne, 1988; and, Pletcher and Tootelion, 
1989) have addressed more important issues, such as whether the respective schemes 
add to, or simply replace, existing sources of funding.   
 
The pilot study, on which this article is based, adapts the methodology used in the UK 
studies for the Malaysian context.  For the first time, empirical analysis is presented on 
critical issues affecting the CGC’s performance. 
 
The structure of this paper is as follows:  
 
 the operation of the CGC is described, together with a brief assessment of 
its role within the financial spectrum 
 the survey methodology is outlined 
 the findings of the survey are presented, focusing on the relationship 
between borrowers, banks and the CGC; and, finance and economic 
additionality 
 a radical new scheme introduced by the CGC is described; the likelihood 
of this Scheme enabling the CGC to achieve its objectives is explored, and 
the lessons of the CGC's experience for other developing countries are 
briefly summarised. 
 
 
The Operation of the Credit Guarantee Corporation 
 
The CGC provides guarantee cover for credit facilities extended to SMEs in three broad 
sectors: general business, agriculture and manufacturing.  The general business sector 
is dominant, typically wholesale and retail outlets, small-scale construction firms and 
hawkers and petty traders. 
 
Bank Negara, the Central Bank, issues guidelines (effectively quotas) covering the 
amount of CGC-linked lending to be undertaken.  This policy has a pervasive influence 
on the utilization of the schemes.  (Malaysia is believed to be unique in operating a 
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formal quota system, although various methods are employed elsewhere to encourage 
participation.  In Korea, for example, banks contribute annually to a fund from which 
loans are granted.)  Penalties are levied on individual banks for non-compliance with 
targets, which happens frequently.  Around half of the banks failed to comply with their 
individual targets over the two-year period until March 1993. 
 
The guidelines also incorporate an obligation to assist the indigenous Malay community 
(Bumiputeras).  Over the CGC’s life-time, such firms have accounted for 55 percent of 
the number and approximately 30 percent of the value of loans.  
  
Since 1972, four main facilities have been offered by the CGC: 
 
 The General Guarantee Scheme (GGS), operating during 1972-81;  
 The Special Loan Scheme (SLS), during 1981-8;  
 The Principal Guarantee Scheme (PGS), during 1989-94;  
 The New Principal Guarantee Scheme, from 1994 to the time of writing.  
 
The introduction of each new scheme has resulted in an increase in the number and 
value of loans granted, but momentum has not been sustained (refer to Table 1 
overleaf). In 1989, the CGC decided to phase out the semi-dormant General Guarantee 
Scheme and the declining Special Loan Scheme and replace them with the Principal 
Guarantee Scheme (PGS).   
 
Compared to the previous schemes, the PGS offered: support to larger firms, 
businesses with net assets or shareholders' funds of up to RM500,000 (RM: Malaysian 
Ringgit; approximately RM4 = £1); a higher limit on credit facilities of RM500,000; and 
an increased guarantee, typically 70 percent of the value of the loan (raised from 60 
percent in prior schemes).  The interest rate was initially fixed at 1.5 percent above Base 
Lending Rate (BLR); whereas until 1987 the rates of interest charged on CGC loans 
were very low, and fixed.  The revised margin more accurately reflected the risks 
inherent in lending to SMEs, and allowed the banks to earn a reasonable return in 
meeting the quotas.  It is significant that the supply of PGS loans slowed down sharply 
when an interest rate cap of 9 percent was enforced by Bank Negara over most of 1991 
and the first part of 1992.  The guarantee premium was set at 0.5 percent of the 
guaranteed portion of the facility, compared to 0.5 percent of loan value under the SLS. 
 
Table 1.  The CGC:  number and value (in RM millions) of approved loans, 1980-94 
 
Year Types of Loan 
 GCS GCS SLS SLS PGS PGS New PGS NPGS
 No. Value No. Value No. Value No. Value
1980 6,103 124.3   
1981 1,148 25.8 17,161 498.2   
1982 294 9.7 16,664 519.3   
1983 236 7.2 10,327 298.3   
1984 150 4.0 7,841 208.2   
1985 77 2.7 5,295 140.0   
1986 40 1.8 4,560 122.5   
1987 33 1.3 3,346 75.2   
1988 20 0.7 2,450 49.8   
1089 5 0.3 1,032 21.4 1,638 78.5  
1990    5,641 n/a  
1991    3,349 206.3  
1992    2,180 174.7  
1993    2,302 205.8  
1994      (2 months)  352 32.0  
1994      (10 months)   3,146 530.1
 
Notes: GGS: General Guarantee Scheme; SLS: Special Loan Scheme; PGS: Principal Guarantee Scheme (withdrawn 
28 February 1994); New PGS: New Principal Guarantee Scheme (from 1 March 1994) 
 
Source:  CGC 
 
Other schemes operated by the CGC since 1986 include those aimed at hawkers and 
petty traders and their trade associations.  Since 1986, over 23,000 guarantees to this 
group have been approved, involving loans with an average value of only RM2,600, and 
amounting to RM59.7m.  While these schemes have been modest in value terms, they 
appear to have played a key role in shaping bankers' perceptions of the CGC - a point 
taken up in the survey findings.  
 
The importance of CGC loans (and conventional bank finance) for SMEs in Malaysia 
has declined over recent years.  While the value of credit facilities extended by the core 
banking system (commercial banks and finance companies) to smaller enterprises had 
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nearly doubled over the five years to 1993, to approximately RM10bn (Bank Negara, 
1993), most of the increase stemmed from lending by finance companies.  The value of 
outstanding CGC loans, RM599m, represented only 6 percent of the core banking 
system's lending to small firms in 1993.  SMEs also have access to funding from other 
sources, including publicly backed development finance institutions (DFIs) and private 
leasing and factoring companies.  Outstanding credit facilities to small firms from outside 
the core banking system were thought to be around RM9-10bn in 1993 (Lin, 1994). 
 
To counter the drift away from bank financing, the CGC launched the New Principal 
Guarantee Scheme (New PGS) in early 1994.  The New PGS is discussed in more 
depth after an empirical analysis of the “old” PGS.  
 
 
The Survey 
 
Our objective was to conduct a pilot study of firms which had utilized the Principal 
Guarantee Scheme, adapting the research methodology used by NERA (1990) and 
Pieda (1992) in evaluating the Loan Guarantee Scheme in the United Kingdom.  Using a 
semi-structured check list of questions, separate interviews were conducted with 
borrowers and their bankers over the summer of 1994.  A number of questions centred 
on the way in which businesses were funded, clearly a sensitive topic for entrepreneurs.  
Reliance on postal questionnaires would have yielded a disappointing response.  The 
bank representatives were generally experienced lenders used to dealing with the CGC.   
 
Lists of guarantee recipients in two states within travelling distance of University Utara 
Malaysia, Kedah and Penang, were obtained from the CGC.  Although the population of 
CGC-backed firms reflects the fact that Kedah is oriented towards agriculture and 
general business, whereas Penang is a major centre of manufacturing, the majority of 
firms in both states is engaged in “general business”.  From a selected sample of 25 
firms in each State, the final sample was 32 firms.  These were mainly retail or 
wholesale businesses, or firms engaged in construction or computer-related activities.  
The sample contains only three manufacturing firms, reflecting the small number of 
manufacturers in the underlying population.   
 
The reasons for non-participation by selected firms illustrate the problems of conducting 
research in a mixed-race, multi-lingual, developing country; for example: it was not 
possible to locate a number of firms, as maps of rural Malaysia are notoriously 
inaccurate; two borrowers had ceased to trade and were in default; and, others (mostly 
Chinese) were not willing to disclose any information.  Non-participants were not 
replaced, mainly because of constraints on time and resources, and it was judged to 
have been impossible to include defaulting firms in the sample. 
 
An Evaluation of the Effectiveness of the PGS 
The survey responses, presented in aggregate to preserve confidentiality, are grouped 
around three key areas: 
 
 the existing (and future) relationship between borrowers, banks and the 
CGC; 
 finance additionality: whether the CGC loans provide additional or 
replacement finance; 
 economic additionality: how much additional economic activity (increased 
sales, profits or employment) stems from the activities of companies which 
receive CGC loans?  
 
Relationship: SMEs, Banks and the CGC 
The CGC is approached only after a request for conventional bank funding has been 
refused; the bank has to confirm that finance would have been offered if collateral were 
available.  A useful starting point was to establish an accurate picture of how this system 
operates in practice. 
 
Only a small minority of borrowers (3 out of 32) knew of the CGC’s existence before the 
guarantee was issued.  The majority (25) learned of the CGC from their bankers, and 
the remainder (4) became aware of it through friends or the press.  Most borrowers (26 
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out of 32) had obtained the CGC funding through their usual bank, and they had relied 
on that bank to apply for the guarantee on their behalf.  It was evident that the CGC has 
preserved a very low public profile, operating at arm's length from its ultimate clients, the 
SMEs, a situation which does not prevail in other countries (Levitsky, 1993, p.6).  In 
such circumstances, the CGC cannot hope to influence the attitude or ability of the 
debtor to repay the loan.  In the absence of a relationship between the CGC and its 
SMEs, it is vital to engender a spirit of partnership between the lenders and the 
guarantee provider (Levitsky and Prasad, 1987).  This would involve sharing the risks 
and rewards of the CGC loans in an equitable manner. 
 
The interest rates on CGC loans were, as stated above, set at artificially low levels by 
the authorities in the 1980s.  This policy distorted allocative efficiency.  The banks' 
natural reaction was to ration credit, as the returns did not reflect the risks involved 
(Greenwald, Weiss and Stiglitz, 1984).  Bank Negara had to set guidelines to force the 
commercial banks to lend.  The imposition of financial penalties for non-compliance was 
hardly conducive to building a strong partnership.  Furthermore, there was no evidence 
in our study that raising the interest margin (to 1.5 percent above BLR) had resulted in 
the active promotion of CGC loans by the banks, a point taken up later. . 
 
Another important factor in creating a partnership is the proportion of the loan that is 
guaranteed.  In the case of the PGS, the standard level of cover was raised to 70 
percent; the bankers were generally satisfied with the 30 percent level of residual risk, 
although this remained high by international standards.  Whatever the chosen level of 
cover, however, confidence will be shaken if disputes arise over claims for repayment.   
 
This aspect of the CGC's operations received scathing criticism by Levitsky and Prasad 
(1987, p.56), who described the CGC as a passive institution which kept its liabilities to a 
minimum by rejecting claims on the grounds of technicalities.  The CGC publishes 
figures for loans classified as non-performing (NPLs), on which, in official loan schemes 
operating elsewhere, the payment of claims would be almost automatic.  In Malaysia, 
the situation is very different (see Table 2 overleaf).   
 Table 2.  Credit Guarantee Corporation Liabilities 
 
 Non Performing Loans1 Claims Processed Claims Paid 
Year Number Value 
(RMm) 
%2 Number Value (RMm) Value (RMm) 
1984 n/a 114.8 12.3 232 1.32 0.13 
1985 n/a 151.4 17.8 202 1.87 0.10 
1986 12,208 201.2 26.8 210 1.99 0.25 
1987 13,902 229.3 34.2 221 2.02 0.54 
1988 12,709 239.5 40.7 228 2.74 0.65 
1989 11,589 236.3 49.2 604 2.92 1.04 
1990 10,515 223.2 38.9 909 9.10 1.19 
1991 9,588 215.0 35.7 641 8.40 2.02 
1992 8,467 209.0 36.0 301 3.90 1.30 
1993 7,787 184.8 34.0 449 5.30 2.40 
 
Notes: 
1. Banks’ estimate of potential bad debts 
2. Non-performing loans as a percentage of outstanding CGC loans 
 
Source: Kanbur, Boocock and Hwa (forthcoming) 
 
Over the period 1986-93, the CGC processed 3,563 claims, totalling RM36.4m; only 
1,505, totalling RM9.3m, were settled.  The remaining 2,058 claims, totalling RM27.1m, 
were either rejected by the CGC or withdrawn by the banks.  The CGC’s justification for 
rejecting claims on a retrospective basis relied on judging the quality of the initial 
appraisal, or the subsequent monitoring, of a loan to be poor.  On the basis of the 
figures in Table 2, one would expect that problems experienced in claiming under the 
guarantee would be a frequent source of complaint.  In fact, the bankers in the pilot 
study put forward a range of views on this topic.  It was generally acknowledged that 
much of the blame for non-recoverable loans lay at the banks' doors; nonetheless, there 
were requests for the publication of data on defaulters, to identify whether certain types 
of borrowers were prone to failure.  On similar lines, it was generally accepted that the 
claims procedure had improved, but some participants (7/32) specifically requested that 
the CGC should speed up, and simplify, the processing of claims.   
 
At present, it would appear that the banks, rather than public funds, have to bear the 
bulk of the losses stemming from bad debts.  However, the cost of operating the CGC is 
not publicly available, and the gap between the CGC’s income and expenditure is 
difficult to calculate.  The CGC derives its income from a number of sources (including 
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the premium charged for the issue of guarantees and interest arbitrage on inexpensive 
funds received from Bank Negara, and Table 2 did not demonstrate a consistent 
relationship between non-performing loans and subsequent payments to banks. 
 
Finally, even though our survey dealt with loans granted under the PGS, there were 
numerous complaints from bankers about heavy losses suffered with the hawkers and 
traders loans.  The high level of bad debts sustained on these small loans, allied to an 
inability to receive payment under the associated guarantees, has made some bankers 
reluctant to direct any borrowers to the CGC. 
 
 
Finance Additionality 
 
In the United Kingdom, the level of finance additionality generated by the Loan 
Guarantee Scheme has been subject to close scrutiny.  Initially, Robson Rhodes (1984) 
suggested that less than one-half of the loans were genuinely additional, a pattern which 
was confirmed by NERA (1990). The latest survey (Pieda, 1992) indicated that 68 
percent of the scheme’s lending was additional, a remarkable improvement.  However, 
Pieda did point out that a high default rate was associated with cases of high finance 
additionality, typically lending to entrepreneurs with no record of achievement, or to 
businesses with little prospect of generating high returns.   
 
The situation in Malaysia is complicated by the Bank Negara quotas.  Under pressure to 
meet targets, bankers may have utilized CGC loans to support inappropriate, high-risk 
lending, thus contributing to the high level of non-performing loans.  Alternatively, the 
requirement to fulfil quotas may have tempted lenders to substitute CGC loans for 
conventional borrowing (Chee, 1986b, p.75). 
 
In framing the rules for the PGS, a prime objective was to increase finance additionality.  
As a consequence, the guarantee issued under the PGS covered only that portion of the 
total bank package exceeding the amount considered to be adequately backed by 
collateral.  The secured element of the bank finance did not require a guarantee hence 
the risk inherent in CGC loans was significantly increased.  The influence of these 
changes was explored in our study. 
 
Borrowers were asked: “If your application for a CGC loan had not been approved, or if 
the CGC has not existed, would you have been able to raise the funds in some other 
way?”  The responses are summarised in Table 3. 
 
Table 3.  Would you have been able to raise the funds elsewhere? 
 
Response Number of 
responses 
Explanation given 
Yes 10 Conventional bank funding could have been accessed; but the CGC 
was preferred because the loan was cheaper 
 
Yes  4 Another government-backed agency would have been approached 
Yes  5 Friends, relatives or illegal sources would have been approached 
N/A  4 Funds were not really required at all 
No  9 Funds were not available elsewhere – these were cases of genuine 
Additionality 
 
 
The next step was to ask the bankers to estimate the amount that they would have been 
able to lend if CGC support had not been available.  Table 4 (overleaf) reveals that the 
32 firms received bank funding totalling RM2.28m; CGC loans accounted for RM1.11m, 
and RM1.17m was advanced through conventional bank lines.  The PGS aims to 
provide “top-up” funds hence the CGC loans should have represented 100 percent 
finance additionality.  However, the bankers conceded that they could have granted 
facilities totalling RM1.58m, reducing the additionality of the CGC loans from RM1.11m 
to RM697,000 (63 percent of their value). 
 
There were 13 out of 32 cases where discrepancies arose between reported and 
estimated additionality, and 10 of these could be classed as zero additionality; for 
example, firms A and C in Table 4 could have obtained the required funding under 
normal bank lines.  In most cases, the bankers would have been prepared to grant the 
facility unsecured, based on the borrower's sound track record, or they would have given 
a higher than normal value to the offered security.  Alternatively, there were assets in 
the background which could have been used to secure the borrowing.   
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Table 4.  The CGC:  Finance Additionality (all figures: RM thousands) 
 
Firm1 Funding package from bank Bankmax2 
amount % 
Est. Add.3
Bank CGC loan Total
A 0 5 5 5 0 (0)
B 30 15 45 30 15 (100)
C 103 17 120 120 0 (0)
   
Aggregate Figures: Total Sample 
32 1,166 1,110 2,276 1,579 697 (63)
 
Notes: 
1. The top three rows show the calculations for 3 companies selected at random. 
2. Bankmax = an estimate of the maximum available level of bank credit, if the CGC had not 
existed. 
3. Est. Add = the estimated level of finance additionality, after taking into account what the 
bank could have advanced. 
 
Despite the comments above, the results for the PGS appear impressive, with 63 
percent of the value of CGC loans classed as additional finance.  This compares 
favourably with the UK Loan Guarantee Scheme, where the NERA (1990) and Pieda 
(1992) studies showed additionality of 48 and 68 percent respectively.  The statistics, 
however, are not comparable: Tables 3 and 4 incorporate information relating to bank 
finance only, whereas the UK studies included data on non-bank funding.   
 
Table 3 revealed (Rows 2 & 3) that nine borrowers could have obtained non-bank 
finance.  These claims seem plausible, as SMEs have increasingly sought funding from 
other financial institutions or government agencies.  However, the borrowers were 
generally unwilling to give precise information on alternative sources of finance, 
especially where illegal sources (so-called loan sharks) were involved.  Our best 
estimate is that the overall finance additionality for the sample would fall below 50 
percent, compared to the 63 percent obtained in our analysis of bank finance alone. 
 
The difficulty of establishing the level of additionality was confirmed when the topic was 
viewed from another perspective.  The bankers were asked to state the principal reason 
why their customer was granted a CGC loan (see Table 5 overleaf). 
 Table 5.  Selection Criteria for CGC Loans 
 
Criterion No. of cases 
High risk   2 
Insufficient security   9 
Sound track record 16 
Cheaper interest rate   2 
To meet quota   3 
Total 32 
 
 
The findings of Table 5 have to be treated with a degree of scepticism, because 
borrowers may have been selected for CGC loans for a combination of reasons.  The 
CGC loan probably yielded 100 percent finance additionality where the reasons are 
“high risk” or “insufficient security”.  The most common influence was a “sound track 
record”, however, implying that the facility would probably have been granted 
unsecured, or that creditworthy customers are selected until the quota is achieved.  The 
quota was cited as the dominant factor in three instances: the bankers strongly hinted 
that CGC loans were simply offered to pre-selected customers until the quota was 
exhausted.   
 
The behaviour of the bankers is thus at odds with the objective of the PGS.  However, a 
cautious attitude is understandable, as their promotion prospects of banking staff may 
be harmed by the incidence of bad debts.  In the UK, as stated above, a high default 
rate was associated with cases of high finance additionality.  If action is taken to reduce 
the level of default, it may have undesirable side effects.  Neither the Loan Guarantee 
Scheme nor the PGS, for example, insist upon a specified level of personal commitment 
from the borrower; such a condition would reduce the incidence of default, but also tend 
to reduce finance additionality by denying finance to owners lacking resources.   
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Economic Additionality 
 
This concept has two broad elements: the direct benefit for the SMEs in terms of 
increased employment, profits or output; and the indirect impact on the wider economy.  
Economic additionality should strictly be calculated with reference to those firms which 
receive “additional” finance; but because of problems in establishing the level of finance 
additionality, this pre-condition has been ignored. 
 
The direct benefit to the recipients will depend, to a large extent, on the way in which the 
funds are utilized.  In 29 of the 32 firms, the borrowers claimed that the finance was 
used in accordance with the original application.  (Two borrowers bought goods for their 
own use, while the other simply onlent the funds at a higher rate of interest.)  In each of 
the 29 cases, the funds were used for working capital purposes hence it was difficult to 
establish a direct link between the CGC loan and the subsequent progress of the firm.  
Furthermore, the provision of funds for working capital is probably less likely to lead to 
sustainable rises in employment and output than expenditure on fixed assets. 
 
Table 6.  CGC loans: impact on employment 
 
Employment Number of firms 
Overall position  
Increase  21 
Decrease    1 
No change  10 
Total  32 
  
Breakdown of 21 “increases” in employment  
Increase of 2-4  14 
Increase of 5-10    5 
Increase of 11-15    2 
Total  21 
  
 
The majority of firms had nevertheless increased employment since receiving the CGC 
loan; the 32 firms increased their workforce by 110 people (178 to 288 employees).  
However, significant increases in employment were confined to just two firms (Table 6).  
Even after the improvements shown in Table 6, there were fewer than five employees in 
19 of the sample firms.  This is significant because, for example, small provisions shops 
providing a living for the owner and his family are not likely to provide a major boost for 
employment in the economy.  
  
With regard to profits and turnover, most firms (27 out of 32) reported enhanced 
performance, but they were unable to quantify the effect of the CGC loans.  The Pieda 
study (1992, p.67) produced very similar results, stating that “almost all” of the firms 
which felt able to comment on this issue considered that output, employment and profit 
were higher than would have been the case without the Loan Guarantee Scheme loan. 
 
The second element of economic additionality takes account of displacement effects, 
i.e., whether additional activity in the assisted firms translates into corresponding 
increases in the level of activity in the SME sector or the economy as a whole.  In the 
Pieda study (1992, Chapter 8), economic additionality was found to be low where 
service sector firms, especially retailers, were involved.  Manufacturing firms generally 
have a greater economic impact and create jobs.  At the national level, it was rare for 
LGS-assisted firms to export their products or substitute for imports.   
 
On this basis, indirect economic additionality in our sample (and the wider population of 
CGC-backed firms) would be expected to be low.  While most firms had attracted new 
customers since receiving the CGC loan, these customers were usually (22 out of 32) 
from within a 50 mile radius of the firm's site and almost always (30 out of 32) located 
within the state.  Only two firms had captured any export business.  The implication is 
that CGC funding has largely displaced local activity. 
 
Another strand of indirect economic additionality concerns the ability of small firms to 
create a more dynamic and innovative society.  We judged that a minority of well-
managed firms demonstrated a very positive attitude towards expansion.  For example, 
one firm specializing in homeopathic medicines had increased its workforce significantly 
and begun to export to the Middle East and the former Soviet Union.  By and large, 
however, the firms were content with modest progress, selling (or producing) fairly basic 
goods for a parochial market.  Apart from the computer-related firms, the use of new 
technology was very modest.   
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The New PGS 
 
It is acknowledged that any conclusions drawn solely from our pilot study have to be 
tentative, in view of the sample size.  However, secondary data produced by the CGC 
and Bank Negara have tended to confirm the survey findings.  Overall, the CGC's 
effectiveness in meeting the needs of SMEs, banks and the wider economy appears to 
have been somewhat limited.  Nevertheless, the CGC has been given a high profile 
without official efforts to encourage the growth of SMEs.  In these circumstances, the 
successful implementation of the New Principal Guarantee Scheme is critical.   
 
The New PGS is designed to cater for the needs of larger companies, especially those 
operating in priority sectors specified by the government, notably the manufacture of 
high technology and resource-based products.  The value of credit facilities eligible for 
guarantee and the level of guarantee coverage were increased.  The interest margin 
was raised to 2.0 percent over the base lending rate, while the guarantee premium was 
left unchanged.  As a result, the total cost for borrowers is now comparable with other 
guarantee schemes across the world.  Decisions on utilization, by borrowers and lenders 
alike, should thus increasingly be taken on the basis of rational economic and risk 
factors (Kanbur, Boocock and Hwa, forthcoming). 
 
The guarantee under the New PGS, covering 70-90 percent of the borrowing, can be 
used in two ways.  It can either cover all facilities made available at the time of approval, 
or the lender can take the secured part of the lending package outside the arrangements 
with the CGC (as with the "old" PGS).  In the case of a firm wishing to borrow 
RM200,000, with collateral valued at RM100,000, the lender could choose to have all 
the borrowing guaranteed by the CGC or simply the excess over the security.  The 
inclusion of loans backed by collateral should mean that the CGC's overall portfolio of 
loans is less risky. 
 
The initial take-up of the New PGS has been extremely impressive (see Table 1).  In the 
period March-December 1994, 3146 loans were granted, with a total value of 
RM530.1m.  A detailed breakdown of these figures is not available, but the increase in 
uptake has probably stemmed from a combination of factors: the use of the guarantee to 
cover all borrowing, rather than the excess over the value of collateral which has meant 
that the average value of each loan has risen sharply; the opportunity for finance 
companies, as well as banks to provide CGC loans for the first time; and the conversion 
of conventional bank or “old” PGS loans to the new Scheme.  
 
The New PGS: an improved loan scheme? 
 
The stated objective of the New PGS is to achieve high levels of uptake and economic 
additionality, but thorny issues of finance additionality and the default rate have not been 
addressed.   
 
The relationship between lenders and the CGC does appear to be improving, and the 
CGC is determined that this trend should continue.  The terms and conditions of the 
New PGS were announced only after extensive consultation with the financial 
community.  Furthermore, changes introduced recently, removing the CGC's ex-post 
evaluation of the banks' appraisal, should help to facilitate the payment of claims.  If the 
initial uptake of the Scheme is to be sustained, financiers must be convinced that 
guarantees will be honoured. 
 
The quotas for CGC loans have been retained, despite their potentially harmful effect on 
the relationship between the CGC and the lenders, and their debatable impact on 
finance and economic additionality.  The imposition of official guidelines may have been 
required to give impetus to the CGC's operations in its early years, but they may 
perhaps have served their purpose.  If the New PGS were attractive to borrowers and 
lenders alike, its usage could be left to market forces. 
 
The degree of finance additionality found in the pilot study was questionable, mainly 
because it proved difficult to isolate the influence of quotas.  With the retention of the 
quota system, it is hard to judge whether additionality will improve or decline for the New 
PGS.  The higher level of guarantee cover and improved interest margin should 
encourage banks and finance companies to direct high risk SMEs to the scheme 
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voluntarily.  Nevertheless, it is not easy to explain the surge in borrowers from an SME 
sector which remains fragmented and traditional in outlook, especially as the 
responsibility for selecting firms remains with the lenders, and the temptation to use New 
PGS loans as replacement finance is still present. 
 
Turning to economic additionality, the pilot study suggested that local displacement 
effects were high, export activity or import substitution was low and innovation was 
infrequent.  For the New PGS to achieve a higher degree of economic impact, the 
CGC's portfolio of companies will have to be radically altered.  Unfortunately, detailed 
information on New PGS- backed companies is not yet available.  The critical problem is 
how to reconcile the differing objectives of the various parties: the CGC, banks, SMEs 
and the authorities.  For example, the exclusion of certain types of propositions 
(particularly retailers) would offer higher economic additionality, but a preponderance of 
high risk innovative companies would tend to result in increased bad debts.   
 
The Implications for other Guarantee Schemes 
 
The balance between helping high risk enterprises, which cannot obtain conventional 
bank funding, and loan losses will always be a delicate one.  The successful operation of 
any loan scheme therefore has to be based upon mutual co-operation between the 
guarantee provider, financial institutions, the authorities and SMEs.  All parties have to 
recognise their rights and responsibilities.   
 
A key element of “good practice” in operating a loan scheme is that lenders should 
approve loans “only when they are convinced that the project is viable ... and they (the 
lenders) will make all possible efforts to collect loan repayments” (Levitsky, 1993).  In 
addition, successful loan schemes do not rely entirely on the lenders to appraise and 
monitor the borrowing.  The experience of the CGC reinforces the value of Levitsky’s 
comments.  Banks in Malaysia have committed funds to projects which have resulted in 
a high level of non-performing loans.  The CGC has been powerless to assist the banks 
in gaining repayment of the loans, operating from a single office and having no contact 
with the SMEs. 
 More generally, the activities of the CGC illustrate the problems of trying to tackle an 
ambitious agenda without the required level of support services.  (This situation may 
change, as the CGC has announced its intention to establish a unit to offer training, 
advisory and consultancy services for SMEs.)  The CGC currently has obligations to 
firms ranging in size from “hawkers and traders” to larger firms operating in the 
government's priority sectors, as well as a continuing obligation to assist Bumiputera 
borrowers.  A rationalisation of schemes might result in a more focused and credible 
approach. 
 
The experience in Malaysia also suggests that attempts to distort market forces, by 
imposing quotas, have not resulted in high levels of finance and economic additionality.  
 
Finally, the case for any government-backed loan scheme rests upon the conclusion 
that, without such schemes, private sector financial institutions would deny finance to 
viable firms which lack security.  Given the rate of default associated with SMEs, such a 
scheme will almost certainly contain an element of subsidy.  In the United Kingdom, for 
example, the net cost of operating the Loan Guarantee Scheme (guarantee payments 
less premium income and security realisations) has been estimated with some degree of 
certainty (NERA, 1990, p.41; Pieda, 1992, p.4).  The scheme’s lending was found to be 
marginally unprofitable for the banks, and the direct cost to the public purse was 
substantial.  However, when the positive impact arising from additional economic activity 
was taken into account, the scheme produced a surplus for the UK Treasury.  In these 
circumstances, the UK banks were (and are) prepared to participate in the scheme.  By 
contrast, as stated above, information on the costs of operation for the CGC are not 
made available.  A more open approach to disclosure, with a breakdown of the costs for 
individual schemes, might encourage sustained usage of the New PGS.  The lesson for 
other schemes is that the operating costs have to be (and be perceived to be) shared 
equitably. 
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